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## ATTACHMENT 1

Comments on Senate Select Committee on Intelligence  
Draft Report by the Subcommittee on Collection,  
Production, and Quality

SUBJECT: The National Intelligence Estimates - B Team  
Episode Concerning Soviet Strategic Capabilities  
and Objectives

The following suggestions pertain to clarity and  
accuracy of the draft report.

Summary and Recommendations

1. Page 5, middle paragraph. The original purpose of the B Team was not "expanded" to make as strong a case as possible that the Soviets strategic objectives were more ambitious than portrayed in the NIEs. This was the purpose of the B Teams' effort from the outset. The second sentence should be revised to state: "The mandate of the B Teams was to make as strong a case as possible, using the same evidence available to the drafters of NIE 11-3/8-76, that Soviet objectives, ICBM accuracies, and low-altitude air defenses were more threatening than estimated by the intelligence community. The B Team on Soviet strategic objectives assumed as additional tasks 'to criticize the methodology underlying the NIE process' and to critique a number of NIE estimates on a wide variety of technical subjects." YES

2. Page 6, second paragraph. After the sentence which ends "...regarding future Soviet capabilities in air defense." the following sentence should be added: "Conversely, the findings of the NIE analysts caused the B Team to take a more specific, somewhat less opened view about current Soviet air defenses." The statement that "not even USAF Intelligence" would buy what the intelligence community considered to be an extreme B Team position on Soviet ICBM accuracies, incorrectly implies that Air Force positions are consistently at the more threatening extremes. In fact, the Air Force takes a more optimistic position than most of the intelligence community concerning the effectiveness of Soviet ICBM capabilities against Minuteman and Soviet air defenses against US bombers. To be accurate the last part of this sentence should be revised to state "... with none of the intelligence agencies buying what ..." YES

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3. Page 6, second paragraph. The second half of the following sentence implies that the A Team sought to change the B Team's position. "Regarding Soviet objectives there was little constructive discussion, each advocate failing to bring sufficient evidence to bear to change existing positions materially." In the initial discussion between the teams, the A Team agreed with the B Team finding that the Soviets aspired to world domination at some unspecified time in the future. The A Team pointed out, however, that it had the burden of estimating practical Soviet objectives and expectations over the next ten years. Thus, there was no effort to cause the B Team to change its findings. Most of the discussion was about the text of the A Team draft paper. Subsequently, to parallel the A Team's responsibilities, the B Team added a judgment concerning Soviet expectations over the next ten years. (The NIO for Strategic Programs advised the B Team that those responsible for preparation of national intelligence objected to many comments in the B Team report on substantive issues other than Soviet strategic objectives, but that the A Team was going to confine its discussions to Soviet strategic objectives and expectations, which was the subject of this part of the experiment.) No

4. Page 10, middle paragraph. The "PFIAB's proposition" was to give highest priority to establishing a group of experts to subject the most critical issues in NIE 11-3/8 to competing analyses. Moreover, as indicated above, the mandate for the experiment was not progressively changed so that the outcome could be predicted in advance. The experiment was to determine if a group of experts using the same evidence available to those preparing the NIE could make a strong case for a more threatening interpretation in the three subject areas selected. While the Subcommittee clearly believes that an experiment with a different purpose would have been more useful, the report should not convey that the purpose of the experiment shifted in the course of carrying it out, except for the additional mandate assumed by the B Team on strategic objectives. No

5. Page 10, last paragraph. To be more accurate, the last sentence on the page should be revised to state that "It did not have as one of its purposes to address the questions ..." The sentence as written is technically correct, but its effect is to convey incorrectly that the NIE failed to achieve its intended purpose. No

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6. Page 11, last paragraph. The phrase concerning the effect of the experiment on the integrity of the NIE process should be revised to read, "which resulted in inaccurate press reports undercutting the integrity of the NIE process and ..." *No*  
While press reports may have had the effect of conveying to the public that the integrity of the NIE process had been undercut, as a matter of fact the integrity of the NIE process remained intact.

7. Page 11, last paragraph. In the first line of this paragraph reference to CIA should be deleted. Without prejudice to any intelligence views about the findings in this paragraph, *YES*  
the attribution of fault should not single out CIA. In fact the chain of responsibility ran from the DCI, the D/DCI for National Intelligence, the NIO for Strategic Programs, and representatives of the intelligence community who were consulted about the experiment. For purposes of this paragraph, attribution to the intelligence community should be sufficient.

8. Page 11, last paragraph. The statement following item (b) in this paragraph is incorrect and should be deleted. *YES*  
The section was prepared by intelligence experts on Soviet politics and policies. The individual mentioned in item (c) should be referred to as "... a relatively junior CIA intelligence officer ..." He is not a weapons technician.

9. Page 14a, top paragraph. Statements about what NIE 11-3/8-76 does not contain are matters of fact. But for the sake of accuracy the report should make clear the difference between what are believed to be deficiencies in the intended purpose of a paper and deficiencies in the substantive findings responsive to that purpose. The Subcommittee's views would be recorded more accurately if the last sentence were changed to read: "Thus, the narrow purpose and scope of both the NIE and the B Team report resulted in the treatment of strategic matters within the cocoon of the familiar. It is a disservice to senior policy makers that NIEs do not alert them to the world of rapidly growing strategic threats and opportunities which are essentially the creatures of neither US nor Soviet initiative--or control." *YES*

10. Page 15, top paragraph. The last sentence should be revised to state: "Neither the NIE nor the B Team report conformed with all of these factors." As written, the sentence states that the preparation of NIE 11-3/8-76 was not free of political pressures. Such a charge is inaccurate and is not supported by findings elsewhere in the report. *NO*

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11. Page 15, last paragraph. The first sentence should be revised to read: "The NIE-B experience sharply demonstrates the intense preoccupation of policymakers and the PFIAB and, by extension, the CIA and the rest of the intelligence community with Soviet strategic weapons." It should be made clear that intelligence priorities and pre-occupations are by necessity a reflection of policymakers' interests.

No

12. Page 16, last paragraph. Part (a) of the first sentence is probably intended to mean "intelligence" judgment.

Yes

The Report

13. Page 32a, paragraph following the double ticked items. A survey of forty experts in and out of government by such a prestigious body as the PFIAB carries great weight within both the intelligence community and presumably the Subcommittee. However, the PFIAB report of its survey could not be interpreted for any practical applications. The report of the survey made available to the DCI did not identify the respondents nor did it indicate whether they were commenting on NIEs in general, NIEs on Soviet strategic programs issued in the 1960s, or the more recent estimates. A principal finding of the Subcommittee report is that the current NIEs on Soviet strategic weapons inadequately serve the needs of the President and senior national leaders. This finding presumably is based on some evidence of leadership dissatisfaction as well as the Subcommittee's own evaluation of what leadership needs and interests are or should be. The reader can conclude that this finding rests heavily on the PFIAB survey, in view of the absence of other investigative findings about leadership attitudes toward current NIEs recorded in the report. Therefore, in the interests of factual accuracy, the contribution of the PFIAB survey to the findings should be stated at this point. Assuming the information available to the Subcommittee was the same as that available to the DCI, the following additional text is suggested following the ticks at the top of page 32a: "The results of the PFIAB survey, while supporting the Board's previous conclusions about NIEs, were reported in general terms not suitable for analysis. The respondents were not identified and their reactions could not be correlated with specific NIEs of a given period. Nevertheless, the findings both reinforced PFIAB's recommendations to ..."

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14. Page 34, next to the last paragraph. Whether the ground rules for the experiment were "significantly altered," as stated in the report, depends in part on a previous point of fact discussed first in paragraph 1 above concerning the original intent of the experiment. The intention was to select as members of the B Team on ICBM accuracy, for example, those missile and guidance experts known to have conducted analyses showing the quality of Soviet ICBMs to be better than estimated by any agency of the intelligence community. The assistance of PFIAB members was sought not only to identify such experts, but also to help induce them to participate in the experiment. The role of the PFIAB in the selection process was anticipated from the outset as essential to establish groups of outside experts who would assume an adversarial relationship with groups from the intelligence community. Moreover, that there were differences of view among A Team members was known in advance and did not constitute an alteration of the ground rules. The experiment was carried out as planned, with the exception already noted.

YES

15. Page 36, top paragraph. This text implies that there was some discrete body of evidence available to the A Team that was not available to the B Team before reaching its findings. This presents an incorrect impression about the evidential basis for judging Soviet strategic objectives. Both teams regarded as pertinent a great variety of evidence, including what the Soviets say in public and in private, Soviet policies and actions, military doctrine and strategy, force posture, research and development programs, intelligence activities, and military exercises. With such a large body of evidence pertinent to this subject, it was not inappropriate for the B Team to use finished rather than raw information. It would be more accurate to say that the two teams placed different weights on the several categories of evidence. The timing of the first B Team draft is significant only to show that the B Team's judgments about Soviet strategic objectives were already well established at the outset.

No

16. Page 37, top paragraph. The selection of the B Team members was not the reverse of that anticipated by the ground rules. The first two sentences should be changed to read: "While the selection of the B Team members was nominally by the DCI, in fact the PFIAB's National Intelligence Estimates Evaluation Committee, in consultation with [REDACTED], the DCI's representative, played the major role in selecting the members."

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17. Page 39, second paragraph, page 40, first paragraph. The finding that 1950 to 1960 was a period of high performance in the preparation of NIEs except for one egregious failure, is, of course, a matter of Subcommittee judgment. Apparently the Subcommittee believes that in the aggregate, given the intelligence information available, the NIEs of that period met the general criteria for service to the national leadership described elsewhere in the report. However, in addition to the missile gap, there were other misestimates or lack of estimates during that period that were of considerable consequence. It is pointed out that the Subcommittee characterization of the 1950 to 1960 period can be challenged on the basis of fact. No

18. Page 41, section "Track Record." In the interests of accuracy and clarity, this report should identify which estimates are being referred to in this section covering the NIE record. Presumably the evaluation covers estimates since 1960. YES

19. Page 48, third paragraph. It would be useful to the reader to point out in this paragraph that NIE 11-3/8-74 was the first to combine both offensive and defensive forces in a single estimate on Soviet forces for intercontinental conflict. YES

20. Page 49 second paragraph. The quotation from NIE 11-3/8-74 which was substantially unchanged in NIE 11-3/8-75 and NIE 11-3/8-76 does not contain a judgment about Soviet objectives. The quoted sentence is merely part of introductory material to raise the question of whether or not the Soviets are seeking some form of strategic superiority over the United States. This section does not therefore convey the key judgments of the NIE on Soviet objectives. (Some of these key judgments are quoted on page 68 of the report discussing the logic used in NIE 11-3/8-76.) NIE 11-3/8-76 states that the Soviets' ultimate goal is dominance over the US and that the Soviets believe their forces for intercontinental conflict contribute to that goal. The key issue is not whether strategic superiority is a long-term Soviet goal; rather, it concerns Soviet expectations and practical objectives for the next ten years. Therefore, this section does not accurately characterize the judgments about Soviet strategic objectives appearing in the NIE 11-3/8 series. No

21. Page 50, last paragraph. The first sentence should be modified to point out that one of the alternative projections constitutes the "best estimate" of the future force levels under a SALT TWO agreement based on the Vladivostok Accord. As YES

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written, the paragraph implies that the NIEs have avoided making single-value best estimates through the technique of alternative projections. For accuracy, the first sentence should be changed to read: "In 1970, in response to requests from consumers, the method of projecting future force levels changed from attempting to define force goals by a single set of low-high numbers to the use of alternative force projections under several varying possible future scenarios, one of which has been defined as the "best SALT-limited estimate." The second sentence should be revised: "... discernible problems in projecting future offensive force levels, ..."

22. Page 51, first paragraph. For accuracy and clarity the first sentence should state which NIEs are being referred to. YES

23. Page 52, second paragraph. In the first parentheses in the last sentence change "19" to "18". YES

24. Page 52 last paragraph, page 53 top paragraph. This paragraph should be revised for accuracy and clarity. The first sentence states that the NIEs did not forecast the re-modeling and hardening of silos but forecast greater emphasis on ICBM survivability. However, improved survivability includes better hardening. The statements about intelligence failures raises the question of how long before the systems became operational (IOC) intelligence foresaw these developments. The harder silos, the cold launch technique, and the larger throw weight of the new Soviet ICBMs were in evidence from three or more years prior to IOC. As the text stands, it does not convey that these developments were known well in advance of the systems reaching operational status. YES

25. Pages 53 to 58e "Predicting Aggregate Numbers"

a. This section contains some minor numerical errors which could easily be corrected without altering the main points in the evaluations. (Detailed review and comment on the numbers can be furnished if desired.) No

b. For the purpose of the Subcommittee report, however, the NIE record in predicting aggregate numbers two years in the future is of little consequence as a basis for evaluating the track record or for recommending improvements in the NIE process. Intelligence forecasts for the period two years hence may be in some cases an indication of the force levels predicted ten years in the future, but in general the annual defense planning

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and budgetary process involves the longer term intelligence estimates of force levels and state-of-the-art in military technologies. This section therefore does not provide the data to support findings elsewhere in the report about the NIEs of the 1960s. In this regard, important findings about past estimates of force levels and their bases, appear in the "Track Record Study of NIE 11-3/8s" by [REDACTED] et al (reference 9 in the list of principal documents examined).

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26. Page 59, last sentence. To acknowledge that the purpose of the NIEs was largely dictated by its consumers, the last part of the last sentence should be revised as follows: ".... and partly because the principal task of the NIE 11-3/8 series was seen by its users and its authors to be...." No

27. Page 61, second paragraph. Evidence is lacking that high level US policymakers considered themselves disadvantaged by the failure of the NIE 11-3/8 series to cast developments in Soviet strategic forces in the context of overall Soviet objectives and policies and in the context of other world developments. Certainly it can be concluded that the NIEs should have done so without awaiting policymakers' requests. But that is not the subject of this paragraph. For accuracy and completeness the paragraph should be introduced as follows: "As a result of shaping the NIEs according to what intelligence understood to be consumer requirements, the estimates failed adequately to set Soviet strategic weapons within the total context of Soviet policy and world dynamics. This has been especially harmful...." No

28. Page 63, middle of the page. The comment about the abbreviations should be deleted. The first time these abbreviations are used in Volume I and in Volume II they are spelled out. No

29. Pages 67 and 68. The logic used by the drafters of NIE 11-3/8-76 in arriving at certain of their findings is described on these pages as though it were fact. If the analytical methods by which the conclusions of the NIE were derived are not clear to the reader, that is a deficiency worth noting. For the sake of accuracy, however, the text should be revised to attribute this description to the impression gained by the Subcommittee about the logic used to arrive at key findings of the NIE. No

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30. Page 69.

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a. The discussion on this page about subsumed net assessments is the impression gained by the Subcommittee; therefore, it is not an issue of fact. It should be noted, however, that it is necessary to clarify what is meant by "net assessments" and what license intelligence has to conduct them.

b. The definition implicit in the Subcommittee report is that a net assessment is any assessment that "incorporates the US factor." However, this definition is far too broad to be useful. Estimating future Soviet policies, actions, or programs involves an analytical model by which the analyst seeks to simulate Soviet planning, policy making, or decision-making. While the specifics of the analytical basis for an estimate are not always revealed, the US factor is an ingredient in all such predictive analyses. An NIE void of any consideration of the US factor (part of the environment in which the Soviets operate) would be an encyclopedia of data without meaning or context. The definition implied in the Subcommittee report will serve to confuse further the issue about the role of intelligence in conducting net assessments.

c. Moreover, the B Team findings were not void of the US factor. The B Team subsumed its own estimate of the future situation over the next ten years in its findings about Soviet expectations. Furthermore, in judging what the Soviets expect during the next ten years, the B Team had to include the US factor in estimating how the Soviet leaders view the competition.

31. Page 75, second paragraph. For completeness this paragraph should note that the static measures of US-USSR forces are depicted in the last part of the summary for a 20-year period, from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s.

No

32. Page 90, first paragraph. To be accurate, the phrase in the last sentence referring to PFIAB's original intentions for the B Team experiment should be changed to read: "... had the report addressed itself to the coverage of Soviet strategic objectives in the present NIE (11-3/8-76), as PFIAB originally intended it to do, rather than past ones...."

No

33. Annex A. Minor corrections in the listings in the Annex can be furnished to the drafter of the report if desired.

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ATTACHMENT 2

Comments on Senate Select Committee on Intelligence  
Draft Report by the Subcommittee on Collection,  
Production, and Quality

SUBJECT: The National Intelligence Estimates - B Team  
Episode Concerning Soviet Strategic Capabilities  
and Objectives

The following comments on the draft report were prepared by the officials responsible for the preparation of the NIE 11-3/8 series of estimates since 1974.

1. In general, the Subcommittee report presents an accurate, professional account of the experiment in competitive analysis conducted in conjunction with NIE 11-3/8-76. We do not believe the most important findings of the report about the NIE 11-3/8 series of estimates are correct. Rather than commenting on the report paragraph by paragraph, we have summarized our comments on the Subcommittee findings and on its recommendations for improving the NIE 11-3/8 series of estimates.

COMMENTS ON THE SUBCOMMITTEE FINDINGS

Utility of NIE 11-3/8

2. Summary of Finding: National Intelligence Estimates on Soviet strategic weapons including NIE 11-3/8-76 have inadequately served the needs of the President and the senior national leadership and have performed a disservice to them primarily because of the narrowness of their focus.

The format and content of the current NIE 11-3/8 series combining Soviet offensive and defensive forces for intercontinental conflict was developed in 1974 as a result of personal contacts with policy-making officials, including the Secretary of Defense, members of the NSC staff, the Assistant J-5 of the Joint Staff, JCS and others, and the chiefs of intelligence organizations who reflected the views of their

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departments. Since 1974 the format and scope of the NIE 11-3/8 series has been adjusted further in response to reactions of consumers including the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. For example, the NIEs have become more precise in conveying uncertainties in such estimates as the hard target capabilities of Soviet ICBMs and have exposed in more detail the analytical basis for findings about Soviet strategic defenses. The NIEs have included annexes to cover subjects of particular interest to consumers of the NIEs that were not the subject of interagency intelligence issuances such as Interagency Intelligence Memoranda.

Policy and planning decisions do not flow from a single annual NIE on developments on Soviet strategic programs, no matter how broadly based in the context of world developments. Decisions by the Administration and the Congress rest on more than perceptions of long-term Soviet goals. They depend most on intelligence forecasts not only of numbers but also of qualitative characteristics of Soviet forces, and on technological possibilities; they involve US hedges against potential threats, preclusive research and development, and procurement decisions to acquire forces five to ten years hence.

This is not to say that the NIE 11-3/8 series precisely satisfied all its many users. For example, the PFIAB has been dissatisfied with the NIEs' methodology and substantive findings. Other consumers believe the results of analyses intended to show trends in the future capabilities of Soviet forces can be misinterpreted as evaluations (net assessments) of the effectiveness of certain US forces. Still other consumers find the scope and content of the NIE about right.

While the last commendatory communication from the President concerning estimates in the NIE 11-3/8 series was received in 1971, on the other hand we have received no complaints. But we do not contend that the absence of complaints from the top leadership establishes the quality of the estimates through a universal negative. Indirect but compelling evidence of the value and utility of the NIEs, if not their quality, is found in the extent of their use. NIE 11-3/8 was a basic reference document in planning and negotiating the Vladivostok Accords. The important findings of the NIE, its depiction of static and dynamic measures, many of its graphic presentations, and even its expressions of uncertainties and differences provide a common basis for use in preparing the President's budget, the annual DoD and DCS posture statements,

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and testimony to Congressional committees. The increasingly stark depiction of Soviet developments in the NIE 11-3/8 series appears to coincide with the greater willingness of the Administration and the Congress to increase allocations for defense. The findings and charts from the NIE have consistently been used in NSC deliberations on SALT and defense planning issues. None of these uses of the estimate nor other evidence available to us supports the Subcommittee's finding that the NIEs have inadequately served the leadership, or that they have done a disservice because their scope was too narrow.

Content of NIE 11-3/8

3. Summary of Finding: NIE 11-3/8-76 is deficient in its failure to set developments in Soviet strategic forces in the wider framework of conventional arms, naval developments, international economics, European politics, Japan, China, third world aspirations and actions, resource disparities and the environmental future.

Given the fact that the purpose and scope of NIE 11-3/8 was responsive to expressed consumer requirements, we do not regard this finding of the report as an accurate description of a deficiency in the NIE 11-3/8 series. Rather, it must be considered as a commentary on the lack of an estimate in the NIE 11-4 series casting developments in all Soviet military forces in the broader context of Soviet objectives, policies, and the total world environment, which the Subcommittee believes the leadership does or should require. The report does not evaluate whether or how well the NIEs in the 11-3/8 series satisfied their actual purpose.

4. Summary of Finding: Net assessments in the NIE 11-3/8 series are subsumed in certain of the NIEs' judgments and have been done in an unacknowledged and amateurish fashion.

Contrary to this assertion, NIE 11-3/8-76 exposes the reader to the analytical bases, including any net assessments conducted, for findings in Volume I and in more detail in Volume II, and reveals uncertainties and differences of view on Soviet capabilities critical to US planning. The interaction or engagement analyses which were conducted to depict trends in Soviet capabilities and their threat implications, employed the most advanced computer models and techniques available to the US Government. The estimate is precise, for example, in describing the basis for our findings (or so-called "net assess-

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ments") about Soviet capabilities to defend against ballistic missiles, low-altitude bombers, and ballistic missile submarines. The estimate shows that the Soviets have major deficiencies in their capability to carry out all the functions critical to successful defensive operations. Obviously, a short Key Judgments section cannot provide the reader the detailed basis for each of its findings.

#### Utility of the B Team Experiment

5. Summary of Finding: The B Team exercise did not reflect the best and most broadly based expertise, and as a "hard-line" experiment it was not constructive. The experiment was further devalued by deliberate leaks to the press at a time when strategic questions of considerable moment were awaiting action by a new Congress and a new Administration.

We generally agree with the Subcommittee's evaluation of the utility of the B Team experiment in the NIE preparation process. Particularly, we believe that the main text of the report contains an accurate account of the episode and excellent substantive evaluation of the B Team's findings on Soviet strategic objectives. However, we believe many of the Subcommittee's judgments about both the B Team exercise and NIE 11-3/8 were based on an evaluation against criteria different from the actual purpose and scope of the experiment and the estimate. We would agree with a finding that, discounting the unfortunate press leaks, the experiment was carried out largely as envisioned by the PFIAB, and that, contrary to the Board's expectations, the experiment showed that this type of competitive analysis will not contribute to the process of preparing NIEs. Such a finding would accord with our expressed views before the experiment was undertaken.

#### COMMENTS ON THE SUBCOMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS

6. We have also taken note of the Subcommittee's recommendations. Those relating to organization for producing estimates are of course dependent on the larger decisions yet to be taken by the Committee and the Administration in the context of new legislation and PRM 11. It would thus be inappropriate for us to comment on them in detail at this time. We agree in prin-

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ciple, however, that estimates might benefit from review by outside experts if the traps of last fall's experiment can be avoided.

7. The Subcommittee's recommendations with regard to our relationship with intelligence consumers coincide with both our policy and our practice. As to those on the format and content of NIE 11-3/8, we believe the detailed comments in earlier sections of this paper need not be repeated. We emphasize, however, that we have recognized the need for a NIE 11-4 this year and have planned to prepare one.

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